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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
While on misdemeanor probation, Joseph Roman Rubio was ordered to perform
community service as a condition of DUI court.  Mr. Rubio allegedly forged his community
service timecard before turning it in to the community service desk in Kootenai County.  Instead
of filing a motion for a probation violation, however, the State charged Mr. Rubio with a felony
for filing a false instrument in violation of Idaho Code section 18-3203.  Mr. Rubio contended
from the start of the proceedings that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute him under the
statute.  After a jury trial, however, Mr. Rubio was found guilty.  On appeal, he asserts that the
district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the information, and when it denied his
motion for a judgment of acquittal.  He also asserts the district court erred when it incorrectly
instructed the jury.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2015, Mr. Rubio was ordered to complete 56 hours of community
service as a condition of DUI Court.  (R., p.22.)  Mr. Rubio performed his community service at
the  St.  Vincent  De  Paul  Thrift  Store  in  Coeur  d’Alene.   (R.,  p.23.)   In  December  of  2015,
however, the State filed a complaint alleging that Mr. Rubio had committed the crime of filing a
false instrument, under I.C. § 18-3203, by submitting a false or forged community service
timecard.  (R., pp.26-27.)
At the preliminary hearing, Lacy Lovejoy—the volunteer coordinator at St. Vincent’s—
testified, along with Kim Hushman, who was a “float clerk” in the district court and filled in as
needed at the community service desk.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-10, p.32, L.7 – p.33, L.1.)  Based
on their testimony, the magistrate court admitted Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2, which were
2respectively copies of the timecard in question, and the “blue sheet”—the Kootenai County
Community Service desk internal document that contained Mr. Rubio’s name, case number, how
many hours he was assigned to work, and the deadline for completing those hours. (Plaintiff’s
Exhibits 1 and 2; 4/1/16 Tr., p.19, L.6 – p.39, L.7.)  The “blue sheet” was based on the judgment
in the case.1  (4/1/16 Tr., p.34, L.15 – p.35, L.12.)
At the close of testimony, Mr. Rubio’s counsel argued that there was insufficient
evidence to show that Mr. Rubio could be prosecuted under the statute.  The statute provides:
Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to
be filed, registered or recorded in any public office within this state, which
instrument, if genuine, might be filed, or registered, or recorded under any law of
this state, or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.
I.C. § 18-3203.  Counsel argued that the evidence did not establish probable cause that the
elements of the statute were violated because Mr. Rubio’s community service timecard was not
an instrument that would be filed in a public office under any law.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.54, L.25 – p.57,
L.1.)  He argued that the timecard did not meet the definition of an “instrument” because that
term identified formal legal documents such as deeds or marriage certificates, and there was no
support in the Idaho Code for labeling the timecard an instrument as that term was used in the
statute.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.54, L.25 – p.55, L.10.)  He also argued that the use of the terms “registered
or recorded” indicated “what the framers of this statute thought would be an instrument.”
(4/1/16 Tr., p.55, Ls.11-16.)  He went on to argue that Mr. Rubio did not “file” the timecard as
1 At the trial, Ms. Hushman confirmed that the judgment in this case was the court order for
community service.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. I, p.88, Ls.9-13.)  These same documents were in
evidence at  the trial.   However,  there were two sides to the timecard,  and the front side of the
timecard was not admitted until the trial.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.30, L.21 – p.31, L.8.)  The date and time
stamps on the respective documents show this.  (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 and 2).
3that term is legally defined but simply turned in his community service hours.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.56,
Ls.7-16.)  He also asked the magistrate court what law, code, or statute the timecard would be
filed under.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.56, Ls.17-21.)  He acknowledged that there was a court order
regarding the community service, but argued there was a difference between a court order and a
law, and there was no law under which Mr. Rubio would have filed his timecard.  (4/1/16
Tr., p.56, L.17 – p.57, L.15.)
At the end of the hearing, the magistrate court stated, “I do recognize those issues raised
as to some of the not defined terms; that is, instrument filed and also the operation of under the
law.   However,  I  would  see  in  the  commonsense  understanding  that  this  would  meet  the
commonsense definitions.”  (4/1/16 Tr., p.59, Ls.1-5 (emphasis added).)  Thus, it bound the case
over to district court.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.59, Ls.6-9; R., p.45.)  The State then filed an information
charging Mr. Rubio with filing a false instrument.  (R., pp.46-47.)  Mr. Rubio pleaded not guilty.
(R., p.53, 4/20/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-24.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Rubio filed a motion to dismiss the information pursuant to I.C. § 19-
815A and I.C.R. 5.1.  (R., pp.67-73.)  In that motion, he argued that the timecard was not an
instrument that was required to be filed, registered, or recorded under any law, and he was
ordered by the court to complete community service “as a means of punishment, not as part of a
contractual obligation.”  (R., p.67.)  He acknowledged that he signed a Kootenai County District
Court  Community  Service  Contract,  which  stated  he  would  maintain  a  record  of  the  hours  he
worked and report them to the community service office but argued that the statute did not apply
because a community service timecard was not an “instrument,” and Mr. Rubio was not required
to file the timecard under any law.  (R., pp.69-72.)
4At the hearing on the motion, Mr. Rubio’s counsel asked the district court to take judicial
notice of the transcript from the preliminary hearing.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.4, L.22 – p.5, L.1.)  She
further  developed  the  argument  as  to  why the  timecard  was  not  an  instrument,  and  she  argued
that there was no law under which Mr. Rubio would file his timecard.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-24,
p.21, Ls.21-24.)  She pointed out that the definitions of these terms would be an issue at trial also
and  asserted  the  State  had  failed  to  prove  there  was  probable  cause  to  establish  the  required
elements at the preliminary hearing, and thus the district court should dismiss.  (6/28/16
Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.)
The district court denied the motion but did not issue a written order.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.22,
Ls.8-11.)  It held that there was “nothing magic about a filing stamp,” and a time and date stamp
was not required for something to be considered “filed.”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.19-22.)  It went
on to state, “I think a reasonable interpretation of the word ‘filed’ is that if you submit something
to really any deputy clerk here in this building, you have filed—with the intent for it to be used
in your case . . . you’ve filed something.”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L.4.)  It also held that
the community service desk was a public office.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-13.)  Notably, when
discussing this, the district court said, “The legal significance is . . . Mr. Rubio’s assertion that
he’s doing what he’s required by law, by court order to do . . . .”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-15.)
Counsel for Mr. Rubio asked the district court to reconsider denying the motion because,
at the preliminary hearing, the State did not prove the timecard was an “instrument” that was to
be “filed, registered, or recorded” under the statute.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.6-16.)  The district
court held that the community service timecard met the definition of an instrument.  (6/28/16
Tr., p.24, Ls.17-19.)  It stated, “An instrument defines rights, duties, entitlements or liabilities
such as contract, will, promissory note or share certificate, and obviously this time card is not a
5contract, will, promissory note or share certificate, but those aren’t listed in exclusion; those are
only examples.”2  (6/28/16 Tr., p.24, L.19 – p.25, L1.)  It went on to say,
This [timecard] is an instrument that defines rights, duties, entitlements or
liabilities.  Your client had a duty, a liability if you want to phrase it that way, to
do his community service, and he is presenting allegedly . . . a document that he’s
purporting demonstrates he performed part of that community service and
allegedly that was forged, so I don’t know how this can be interpreted as anything
other than an instrument.  It deals with Mr. Rubio’s rights, duties, entitlements,
liabilities vis-à-vis the State of Idaho and the court order.
(6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-12.)
At  that  point,  Mr.  Rubio’s  counsel  said,  “I’m just  .  .  .  further  raising  the  issue  that  the
State didn’t prove that there’s any law that required that time card to be registered,3 and if it’s
going to be an argument that the court ordered it . . . there’s different remedies for that.”
(6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.13-19.)  The district court said, “Well, I’m not exactly understanding what
you’re saying, but the motion to reconsider is denied.”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-22 (emphasis
added).)
At the trial,4 the  State  called  Ms.  Lovejoy  and  Ms.  Hushman  again,  along  with  one  of
Mr. Rubio’s employers, and the police officer who investigated the alleged crime.  (See 7/18/16
Tr., Vols. I and II generally.)5  Much like the preliminary hearing, the testimony of Ms. Lovejoy
and Ms. Hushman focused on what happened to make them suspect that Mr. Rubio had forged
2 The district court used the definition from Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc. 154 Idaho
259, 265 (2012).  There, this Court cited to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term.
3 It appears counsel intended to say “filed, registered, or recorded” as that was the argument in
the motion to dismiss.  (R., p.72.)
4 Judge Mitchell presided over the motion to dismiss hearing, but Judge Simpson presided over
the trial.
5 The trial took place over two days: July 18, 2016 and July 19, 2016.  Undersigned counsel
received two bound volumes of the transcript for the first day.  The first volume contained the
proceedings prior to the lunch recess; the second contained the proceedings after lunch.  As such,
they will be referred to as “Vol. I” and “Vol. II.”
6his timecard, and the process by which community service hours were recorded.  (7/18/16
Tr. Vol. I, p.83, L.9 – p.122, L.8, 7/18/16 Tr. Vol II, p.5, L.18 – p.31, L.24.)  Mr. Rubio’s
employer, Mr. Leedy, testified regarding when he recalled working with Mr. Rubio because
some of the dates on his community service timecard were allegedly dates Mr. Rubio had
worked with Mr. Leedy.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.32, L.9 – p.45, L.11.)  Coeur d’Alene Police
Officer Knoll also testified about his interrogation of Mr. Rubio.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.46, L.1 –
p.57, L.3.)  Officer Knoll interrogated Mr. Rubio on video, and the jury watched the video.
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3; 6/28/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.7.)  Mr. Rubio also testified.
(7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.65, L.18 – p.85, L.23.)
After the State rested, Mr. Rubio’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.59, Ls.1-5.)  She argued that the State had not
met its burden to prove the timecard was an instrument, and there was no testimony or evidence
presented to that effect.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.59, Ls.11-22.)  She also argued that the State had
not met its burden to prove that the timecard was false or forged, or that the community service
office was a public office within the meaning of the statute.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.59, L.23 –
p.60, L.13.)  Finally, she pointed out that the State had not presented any evidence—in the form
of a statute or otherwise—to prove that the timecard itself was required to be filed under any law.
(7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.60, L.14 – p.61, L.13.)
The State argued that, because Judge Mitchell held—in deciding the motion to dismiss—
that the timecard was an instrument that could be filed under the law of the State of Idaho, and
the  community  service  desk  was  a  public  office,  those  issues  were  “matters  for  the  jury  to  be
instructed on” as they were “legal matters.”  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.61, L.17 – p.62, L.1.)  The
State also argued that the statute did not indicate that the timecard was “required to be filed”
7because the statute said, “might be filed, registered, and recorded.”  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.62,
Ls.22-25.)  Based on this language, the State argued that this was “not an element.”  (7/18/16
Tr. Vol. II, p.62, L.24.)
In response to the State’s comment regarding “legal matters,” Mr. Rubio’s counsel
pointed out that, even in a controlled substance case, the State needs to prove that the substance
is controlled and illegal under the laws of Idaho.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.63, Ls.13-18.)  The
district court said,
I’m at somewhat of a disadvantage having not been there at the hearing, but I did
review the minutes of the decision by Judge Mitchell. And he specifically found .
.  .  that  the  community  service  office  is  a  public  office.  Once  you  deliver  a
document to the deputy clerk, you know it will be used.  He further found that
[the] community service card was an instrument that defines a liability and duty to
do community service.
(7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.64, Ls.12-20.)  With no further analysis, the district court denied the Rule
29 motion.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.64, L.21.)
At the jury instruction conference, Mr. Rubio’s counsel strenuously objected to the
State’s proposed instruction that read, “Under Idaho law, a community Service timecard, when
filed in a court case, is an instrument.”  (R., p.93; 7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.91, Ls.4-25.)  She argued
that no law supported that, but the district court said, because Judge Mitchell found that to be
true, “It makes it the law of the case for record, and all of our hands are tied.”  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol.
II, p.92, Ls.2-5 (emphasis added).)  Counsel pointed out that her requested instruction on the
issue gave the jury the definition of an instrument from Black’s Law Dictionary, so the jury
could determine whether it met that definition.6  (7/18/16 Tr., p.91, Ls.14-18.)  Counsel also
6 Defense counsel’s proposed instructions were apparently not made a part of the record.
Undersigned counsel requested a copy of those instructions from the district court on June 22,
2017, and again on July 5, 2017, but the district court has not provided them as of yet. However,
defense counsel’s arguments on the record are sufficient to show the nature of her requests.
8objected to the State’s proposed jury instructions that read, “Under Idaho law, the Kootenai
County community service desk is a public office” and “Under Idaho law, proof of completion of
community service, when such service is done pursuant to a court order, may be filed under the
law of the State of Idaho.”  (R., pp.94-95; 7/18/16 Tr., p.92, L.18 – p.93, L.11.)  Despite
counsel’s objections, and her renewed objections the following day, the district court gave those
jury instructions.  (R., pp.144-46; 7/19/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-18.)  It stated, “Basically the court’s
position is I’m constrained by the law of the case, prior rulings by Judge Mitchell as to 16, 17,
and 18.”  (7/19/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-10.)
Subsequently, the jury found Mr. Rubio guilty.  (R., p.156.)  The district court imposed a
sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.167-
68.)  Mr. Rubio filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.170-73.)
9ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Rubio’s motion to dismiss because a community
service timecard is not an instrument that might be filed under any law; therefore, there
was no probable cause to believe Mr. Rubio committed the crime of offering a false or
forged instrument for record?
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rubio’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal?
3. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury and reducing the State’s
burden of proof to prove all the elements?
10
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Rubio’s Motion To Dismiss Because A Community
Service Timecard Is Not An Instrument That Might Be Filed Under Any Law; Therefore, There
Was No Probable Cause To Believe Mr. Rubio Committed The Crime Of Filing A False
Instrument
A. Introduction
There was insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Rubio committed the crime of offering
a false or forged instrument as defined in I.C. § 18-3203 by allegedly filing a forged community
service timecard.  Therefore, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Rubio’s motion to
dismiss.
B. There Was Not Substantial Evidence Upon Every Element To Establish Probable Cause
That  Mr.  Rubio  Committed  The  Crime  Of  Offering  False  Or  Forged  Instrument  For
Record Under I.C. § 18-3203
A defendant held to answer a criminal charge after a preliminary hearing may challenge
that finding by filing a motion to dismiss in the district court.  I.C. § 19-815A. The purpose of a
preliminary hearing is to “determine if an offense has been committed, and further if there is
probable cause to believe that the crime was committed by the accused.” State v. Schall, 157
Idaho 488, 491 (2014) (citation omitted).  A finding of probable cause to bind the case over to
the district court must “be based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the
offense charged.”  I.C.R. 5.1(b)  The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de
novo review. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011).
1. The District Court Erred In Finding That The Timecard Was An Instrument
In finding that Mr. Rubio’s community service timecard was an instrument, the district
court failed to follow this Court’s definition of “instrument,” defied the plain meaning of
11
“instrument,” and failed to follow this Court’s rules for proper statutory construction.  This Court
applies the following principles of statutory interpretation:
The  objective  of  statutory  interpretation  is  to  derive  the  intent  of  the  legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.
Id. at 866-67 (citation omitted).
a. The  Timecard  Was  Not  An Instrument  Because  It  Did  Not  “Define  Any
Rights, Duties, Entitlements, Or Liabilities,” Which Is The Plain Meaning
Of The Term “Instrument” Used By This Court
The district court’s holding that Mr. Rubio’s community service timecard was an
“instrument” as intended by the legislature in Idaho Code § 18-3203 was error because it does
not meet the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of “instrument.”  This Court, in Steel Farms,
Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 265 (2012), has already adopted the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of the term, and the district court failed to follow that definition.
Idaho Code § 18-3203 is entitled “Offering false or forged instrument for record” and
reads as follows:  “Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged
instrument to be filed, registered or recorded in any public office within this state, which
instrument, if genuine, might be filed, or registered, or recorded under any law of this state, or of
the  United  States,  is  guilty  of  a  felony.”   Thus  the  State  had  the  burden  to  prove  beyond  a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Rubio’s timecard was an “instrument.”
There is no definition of the term “instrument” in the statute.  “Where the legislature has
not provided a definition in the statute, terms in the statute are given their common, everyday
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meanings.” State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477–78 (2007) (citation omitted).  The relevant
ordinary definition of the term “instrument” is “a formal legal document (such as a deed, bond,
or agreement).” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/instrument
(last visited June 24, 2017).
This Court has adopted the legal dictionary definition of “instrument,” as a “written legal
document  that  defines  rights,  duties,  entitlements,  or  liabilities  such  as  a  contract,  will,
promissory note, or share certificate.” Steel Farms, Inc., 154 Idaho at 265 (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY).  Mr. Rubio’s timecard could not reasonably be construed to meet this definition.
The district court stated that the timecard “deals with Mr. Rubio’s rights, duties,
entitlements, liabilities vis-à-vis the State of Idaho and the court order.” (6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.9-
12) (emphasis added).  But this Court’s definition specifies that an instrument is a legal
document that “defines” such duties and liabilities, not as any writing that simply “deals with”
duties and liabilities. Id.
Mr. Rubio’s timecard was not a formal legal document, and it was nothing like a deed,
bond, contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate. It did not even have his name on it. It
also did not define anything. Nothing on the timecard outlined any duty or liability of Mr. Rubio.
The timecard was simply used to track his hours; it did not define what those hours should be.
The timecard was simply a form --- a grid, with columns for “Date,” “Hours,” “Sign.,” and
“Agency,” and places for the supervisor’s name and telephone number.  (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.)
To qualify as an “instrument,” a document must be something more than simply a piece
of writing.  If, for example, a contract requires one party to provide receipts in exchange for
reimbursement of expenses, the contract is the instrument—not the receipts. The contract defines
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the parties’ rights and duties and is therefore an “instrument” contemplated by the statute at issue
here, “Offering false or forged instrument for record,” I.C. § 18-3203.
Nevertheless, here the district court found:
This is an instrument that defines rights, duties, entitlements or liabilities.  Your
client had a duty, a liability if you want to phrase it that way, to do his community
service,  and  he  is  presenting  allegedly  .  .  .  a  document  that  he’s  purporting
demonstrates  he  performed part  of  that  community  service  .  .  .  so  I  don’t  know
how this can be interpreted as anything other than an instrument.
(6/28/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-9.)  This holding was in error.  The timecard did not define Mr. Rubio’s
duties or liabilities.  As such, the timecard was not an “instrument.”
b. Even If The Term “Instrument” Is Ambiguous, The Other Words Used In
The Statute, As Well As The Legislative History Of The Statute, Make It
Clear That Turning In An Allegedly False Or Forged Timecard Is Not
Subject To Prosecution Under I.C. § 18-3203
Even if this Court finds that the term “instrument” is ambiguous, the timecard does not
meet any properly construed definition of the term. There is very little precedent regarding
I.C. § 18-3203.  The only appellate case to address it in any detail was State v. Callaghan, 143
Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006).  There, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that it was enacted in 1887.
Id. at 859.
The language “filed, registered, or recorded” makes it clear that when the legislature
enacted the statute, it was focused on issues of property ownership and the filing, recording, or
registration that may be necessary for transactions or proving ownership.  The definition of the
verb form of “record” is, “To deposit, (an original or authentic official copy of a document) with
an authority.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (9th ed. 2009).  As an example, the dictionary
uses the following: “she recorded the deed in the county property office.” Id.  Similarly,  the
definition of the verb form of “register” is, “To enter in a public registry” such as when one
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registers a new car.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (9th ed. 2009).  Both of these acts would
obviously be done under a law of the State of Idaho.  For example, people are required to register
cars under I.C. § 49-401A.
Also, when the statute was enacted in 1887, the language was the same as California
Penal Code Section 115(a), which was enacted in 1872.  Thus, it is highly likely that, like many
other statutes at the time, it was adopted directly from California. See e.g. State v. Gutke, 139 P.
346, 347 (1914) (“This statute appears to have been adopted from California by the 1872 Codes,
and it was first introduced into the Idaho statutes in the 1887 Revised Statutes.”).  In interpreting
the California statute, Penal Code Section 115(a), the First District Court of Appeal of California
defined an instrument as follows:  “With reference to writings the term “instrument” as
employed in our statutes has been defined to mean an agreement expressed in writing, signed and
delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on real property, or
giving a right to a debt or duty.” People v. Frazer, 137 P. 276, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913.)
Notably, it also said, “every paper writing is not necessarily an instrument within the settled
statutory definition of the term.” Id.
Although some California courts have more recently expanded that definition, the Frazer
court’s definition should be followed in this case because it is the original interpretation and
there has been no further Idaho legislative changes to the statute.  “This [C]ourt has consistently
held that ‘(a) statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction . . . will be presumed to be
adopted with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction.’”
Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 5 (1980) (quoting Nixon v. Triber, 100 Idaho 198, 200 (1979)
(other citations omitted)).  The Court went on to hold, “Therefore, in the absence of some other
legislation which would clearly suggest a different result, we should follow the interpretation
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which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had placed upon their comparative negligence statute prior
to 1971.” Id. (footnote omitted).  There has been no other legislation to further define the term
“instrument” in Idaho.
The only Idaho appellate court precedent where the defendant was ultimately convicted
under the statute at issue here was an unpublished decision in which the Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant’s conviction for submitting false documents that purported to convey an
interest in real property to the Nez Perce County Recorder’s Office. State v. Wright, 2011 WL
11048164, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011).  This is clearly the kind of act the statute was
intended to prohibit.
Finally, under the doctrine of lenity, this Court should find that turning in an allegedly
false community service timecard is not subject to prosecution for filing a false instrument under
I.C.  §  18-3203.   “‘The  rule  of  lenity  states  that  criminal  statutes  must  be  strictly  construed  in
favor of defendants.’” State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 (1993) (overruled on other grounds).
When a statute is ambiguous, the doctrine of lenity requires courts to construe the statute in favor
of the defendant. State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 2002).  Mr. Rubio asserts that this
Court should hold that I.C. § 18-3203 does not allow prosecution where, pursuant to a court
order,  a  defendant  files  an  allegedly  forged  community  service  timecard.   If  the  statute  is
ambiguous regarding the term “instrument,” this Court should apply the rule of lenity, construe
the statute strictly against the State, and find that the district court erred in denying Mr. Rubio’s
Motion to Dismiss because neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the statute
indicates that Mr. Rubio was subject to prosecution under I.C. § 18-3203.
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2. Mr. Rubio’s Timecard Could Not Be “Filed Under Any Law”
In addition to the requirement that the timecard be an “instrument,” the statute also
requires the timecard be an instrument that “might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law
of this state, or of the United States.”  I.C. § 18-3203.  The district court relied on no authority
when it issued its order denying the motion to dismiss.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.22, L.8 – p.25, L.22.)  In
fact, it admitted that it did not understand the argument regarding the requirement that the
instrument might be filed, registered, or recorded under a law.
Further, the State never provided any evidence of any law under which Mr. Rubio’s
timecard might have been filed.  Indeed, the district court’s only reference to this element of the
statute is the following statement:  “The legal significance is Mr. Rubio’s assertion that he’s
doing what he’s required by law, by court order to do . . . .”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-15.)  There
was no law under which it might have been filed.  There was a court order, but that is not a law.
And when counsel asked the district court to reconsider because the State had not proven that the
timecard might be filed under any law, the district court said, “Well, I’m not exactly
understanding what you’re saying, but the motion to reconsider is denied.”  (6/28/16 Tr., p.25,
Ls.13-22.)  This was error for several reasons.
First, this Court recently commented on the difference between a law and a court order in
State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722 (2014).  There, one of the issues was whether Mr. Herren could
be found guilty of violating a statute prohibiting violation of a no-contact order. Id. at 724-25.
The no-contact order stated, inter alia, that Mr. Herren could not contact or knowingly remain
within 100 feet of a Mr. McDermott. Id. at  724.   At  a  subsequent  HOA meeting,  Mr.  Herren
realized Mr. McDermott was in attendance and therefore moved to the back of the room, but the
magistrate court found Mr. Herren guilty of violating the no-contact order. Id.  On appeal,  the
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district court held that there was substantial evidence to support the conviction because he had
knowingly remained within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. Id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals
subsequently reversed, and the Idaho Supreme Court granted review. Id. at 725.
The State argued that because “distance restrictions are explicitly contemplated as being
part of a no contact order, and the rule explicitly indicates that any violation of the order itself is
a separate crime, that ‘contact’ in violation of the order is defined by the no contact order.” Id.
Mr. Herren argued that it was the legislature’s role to define crimes, and the term “contact”
should thus be given its ordinary meaning. Id.  This Court ultimately reversed Mr. Herren’s
conviction because the statute at issue prohibited “contact,” and there was no actual contact. Id.
at 726.  It stated, “Although Herren violated the terms of the no-contact order by remaining
within  100  feet  of  McDermott,  this  was  not  “contact  with  the  stated  person  in  violation  of  an
order” in violation of Idaho Code section 18–920(2).” Id. at 726.
In  a  footnote,  this  Court  said  that  if  it  were  to  accept  the  State’s  interpretation  of  the
statute, it would “be holding that a judge issuing a no contact order has the power to define
conduct by a particular individual which would constitute a crime other than contempt.” Id. at
726 n.1.  It went on to state, “We express doubt that the Legislature intended to delegate the
power to promulgate criminal laws to individual judges as courts do not have the power to define
crimes.” Id.  The  same  reasoning  applies  here.   There  was  no  law  under  which  Mr.  Rubio’s
timecard might have been filed.  Therefore, the district court relied on the fact that there was a
court order to define the alleged crime.  But the court order was not a law.  Thus, because all the
elements of I.C. § 18-3203 were not met, Mr. Rubio should not have been charged with this
crime.  The district court ignored the “under any law” requirement.
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Further, contrary to the State’s characterization that this was actually not an element
because the statute uses the word “might” (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.62, Ls.22-25), the Idaho Court
of Appeals has made it clear that this is indeed an element.  In Callaghan, the defendant was
convicted under I.C. § 18-3203 in relation to automobile insurance fraud.  143 Idaho at 857-58.
However, the Court of Appeals held that the district court erred when it denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss because another statute governed the defendant’s actions, and I.C. § 18-3203
was not “an alternative enforcement mechanism.” Id. at 859.  With respect to the “under any
law” element in I.C. § 18-3203, the court stated, “We further note that the parties have offered no
law, other than Title 49 [the motor vehicle statute], that could be construed in this case as
fulfilling the ‘under any law’ requirement of I.C. § 18-3203 . . . .” Id. at 859, n.4.  Therefore, the
court wrote, “Without any law outside the bounds of Title 49, we are directed by I.C. § 18-
3203’s ‘under any law’ requirement back to I.C. § 49-1430 . . . .” Id.  Here, the “under any law”
requirement was not fulfilled at all.  Unlike Callaghan, there was no law under which Mr. Rubio
might have submitted his timecard.
Finally, the district court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss because it did not
specifically find that there was substantial evidence to prove this element.  In fact, it denied
Mr. Rubio’s motion despite the fact that if did not understand counsel’s argument regarding this
element; but instead of asking counsel to clarify, it simply denied the motion.  (6/28/16 Tr., p.25,
Ls.13-22.)  Therefore, there was no possible way it could have found that there was substantial
evidence on each element to support the information.
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II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rubio’s Rule 29 Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal
A. Introduction
The State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict for filing a
false instrument.  Specifically, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime: that the community service timecard was an “instrument,” that, “if genuine, might
have  been  filed  under  any  law of  the  State  of  Idaho  or  the  United  States.”   Because  the  State
failed to prove these elements, the district court should have granted Mr. Rubio’s motion for
judgment of acquittal on this offense.7
B. The  District  Court  Erred  When  It  Denied  Mr.  Rubio’s  Motion  For  A  Judgment  Of
Acquittal Because It Failed To Analyze Whether The Elements Had Been Proven Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt, Relying Instead Only On Judge Mitchell’s Pretrial Order Denying
The Motion To Dismiss
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) requires that the trial court “shall order the entry of judgment
of acquittal” on any charged offense if, “after the evidence on either side is closed . . . the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . .” I.C.R. 29(a).
That is because the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a
part of that due process, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
element of the offense.”
7 Judge Simpson presided over the trial and thus heard this motion.  As Judge Simpson relied on
some of Judge Mitchell’s prior findings on the motion to dismiss, the two judges are identified
by name in this section as necessary for the purpose of clarity.
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State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545 (2015) (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)).
The State has the burden to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 546.  Here, the State did not prove at least two of the essential elements.
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion, this Court asks whether,
“after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); State v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012)).
Based on the same reasons as argued in Section I, Mr. Rubio asserts that the district court
should have granted the Rule 29 motion because no rational trier of fact could have found the
timecard was an “instrument” that, if genuine, might have been filed under any law.  Under
I.C. § 18-3203, the State had to prove not only that Mr. Rubio filed a false or forged instrument
but that the instrument, if genuine, might have been filed under any law of this State, or of the
United States.
The district court, however, did not consider whether any rational trier of fact could have
found each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Instead, after detailed arguments on the
issues of whether the timecard was an instrument within the meaning of the statute and whether
the “under any law” element had been met (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.59, L.3 – p.64, L.9), the district
court did not make its own decision but simply deferred to Judge Mitchell’s holding.  Indeed,
after the arguments from counsel on the Rule 29 motion, Judge Simpson simply said,
I’m at somewhat of a disadvantage having not been there at the hearing, but I did
review the minutes of the decision by Judge Mitchell.  And he specifically found
on 6/28/16 that the community service office is a public office.  Once you deliver
a document to the deputy clerk, you know it will be used.  He further found that
[the] community service card was an instrument that defines liability and duty to
do community service.
21
(7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.64, Ls.12-20.)  Based on this, and without any discussion of whether the
timecard could be filed under any law, or any analysis of its own whatsoever, the district court
denied the motion.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.64, L.21.)
This was error.  Indeed, there is no indication that Judge Simpson applied the proper
analysis in deciding the motion.  He never held that any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  And he did not need to be at the
pretrial hearing on the motion to dismiss in order to decide the Rule 29 motion because the Rule
29  motion  was  filed after a trial over which he presided.  Therefore, he had all the necessary
information to decide whether all the elements had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, given his reliance on Judge Mitchell’s prior holdings, it is not evident that he did so.
The order on the motion to dismiss was irrelevant at this stage because a trial had taken place and
arguments about the elements were made to him, so it was for him to decide the motion.  Also,
like Judge Mitchell, he failed to specifically address the “under any law” element of the statute.
It is not clear, but given Judge Simpson’s reliance on the “law of the case doctrine” with
respect to the jury instructions—as discussed below—this was apparently his justification for
following Judge Mitchell’s holdings.  However, this was not a proper application of that
doctrine, and he was not bound by it as he seemed to believe.
Like  stare  decisis,  the  law  of  the  case  doctrine  “protects  against  relitigation  of  settled
issues and assures obedience of inferior courts to superior courts.” Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 118
Idaho 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting NAACP, Detroit Branch v. Police Officers Ass’n, 676
F.Supp. 790, 791 (E.D.Mich.1988)).  The doctrine provides that “upon an appeal, the Supreme
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the
decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout
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its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal....” Stuart v. State,
136 Idaho 490, 495 (2001) (quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515 (2000)) (other
citation omitted).  Thus, the doctrine is focused on preventing relitigation of issues that have
been decided by a higher court.  However, as the Stuart Court noted, the law of the case doctrine
“directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit the tribunal’s power.” Id. (quoting Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)).
In Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court explained that “[u]nlike the more precise
requirements of res judicata, law of the case is an amorphous concept.”  460 U.S. at 618.  The
Court  went  on  to  state,  “As  most  commonly  defined,  the  doctrine  posits  that  when  a  court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent
stages in the same case.” Id.  However, in a footnote it stated, “Under law of the case doctrine,
as now most commonly understood, it is not improper for a court to depart from a prior holding
if convinced that it is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Id. at 618 n.8.
(citation omitted).  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held,
The authority of a district judge to reconsider a previous ruling in the same
litigation, whether a ruling made by him or by a district judge previously
presiding in the case, including (because the case has been transferred) a judge of
a  different  court,  is  governed  by  the  doctrine  of  the  law  of  the  case,  which
authorizes such reconsideration if there is a compelling reason, such as a change
in, or clarification of, law that makes clear that the earlier ruling was erroneous.
Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
In this case, Judge Simpson was not constrained by Judge Mitchell’s prior findings.  His
duty in deciding the Rule 29 motion was to analyze the evidence presented at the trial and
determine whether the State had proved the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  If he
found that Judge Mitchell’s findings regarding the motion to dismiss were clearly erroneous, he
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could have granted the Rule 29 motion, but he did not analyze those findings, he simply followed
them.
This was error not only because he was not bound to follow Judge Mitchell’s holdings
but, more importantly, because of the different standard of proof on a Rule 29 motion.  At the
motion to dismiss hearing, Judge Mitchell was only deciding if there was probable cause to bind
the case over based on a finding of substantial evidence on each element.  (I.C.R. 5.1(b); 6/28/16
Tr., p.23, Ls.16-19.)  By contrast, in deciding the Rule 29 motion, Judge Simpson needed to
determine whether the State had proved every element such that any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  As such, the law of
the case doctrine was inapposite here.  Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, if a district court’s
findings when deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss were required to be followed after a trial,
there would be no reason to go to trial as all the elements would have already been “proven” in
deciding the motion to dismiss.  Therefore, Judge Simpson should have performed an
independent  analysis  on  each  element.   And  even  if  the  law  of  the  case  doctrine  applied,  the
precedent makes clear that he could have arrived at different conclusions.  At this stage, the
district  court  should  have  held  that  Judge  Mitchell’s  holding  that  the  timecard  was  an
“instrument” was clearly erroneous because the timecard did not define anything.  Further, the
court should have held that the State did not prove there was any law under which the timecard
might be filed.
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III.
The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury And Reducing The State’s Burden
Of Proof To Prove All The Elements
A. Introduction
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of the alleged crime—the jury was
instructed that, “Under Idaho law, a community service timecard, when filed in a court case, is
an instrument.”  (R., p.144.)  Because the jury was informed that a community service timecard
was actually an instrument, this removed the requirement that the State prove that the timecard
was in fact an instrument.  This violated Mr. Rubio’s right to due process.  Similarly, the jury
was instructed that, “Under Idaho Law, proof of completion of community service, when such is
done pursuant to a court order, may be filed under the law of the State of Idaho.”  (R., p.146.)
Not only did this instruction remove the requirement that the State prove there was a law under
which the timecard might be filed, it was simply wrong.  Judge Mitchell did not hold that it could
be  filed  under  a  law  of  the  State  of  Idaho.   He  held  that  Mr.  Rubio  could  file  the  timecard
pursuant to a court order.
B. The  District  Court  Erred  By  Incorrectly  Instructing  The  Jury  On  The  Elements  Of
Offering A False Or Forged Instrument For Record
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010) (citations
omitted).  Whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citation omitted).  An error
in jury instructions constitutes reversible error when the instruction misleads the jury or
prejudices the party challenging the instruction. Id. (citing State  v.  Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310
(1998)).
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In this case, Jury Instruction 15 informed the jury that “The state must prove each of the
following” and then outlined six elements of required proof.8  (R., p.143.)  Instruction 15 then
also informed the jury “If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty.”  Instructions 16, 17, and 18 then immediately took three of
those outlined elements away from the jury.  (R., pp.144-46.)  Instruction 16 told the jury that
“under Idaho law,” the timecard is an instrument, Instruction 17 told the jury that “under Idaho
law” the community service desk is a public office, and Instruction 18 told the jury that “under
Idaho law” filing proof of community service performed pursuant to court order is filing under
any law of Idaho.  (R., pp.144-46.)
These instructions both misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Rubio.  They misled the jury
in that they were internally inconsistent—having just been told that it is to decide whether the
State proved each of the six elements listed, the jury is immediately then told that half of those
elements do not actually need to be proven.  Mr. Rubio was prejudiced because his due process
rights to be convicted of a felony only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element
were violated.  Finally, instructions 16, 17, and 18 are simply wrong.  No Idaho law states that a
timecard is an instrument, the community service office is a public office, or that filing a
document pursuant to a court order is filing “under any law of Idaho.” Because it misstated the
law and provided instructions that misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Rubio, the district court
committed reversible error.
8 Specifically, the jury was instructed that the state must prove each of the following: “1. On or
about November 20, 2015, 2. In the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho 3. The defendant,
JOSEPH ROMAN RUBIO, knowingly procured or offered, 4. A false and/or forged instrument,
5. To be filed in any public office within the state, 6. Which instrument, if genuine, might be
filed, or registered, or recorded under any law of this state, or of the United States.”
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Jury instructions may not invade the province of the jury. “If a jury instruction lightens
the prosecution’s burden of proof by creating conclusive presumptions of guilt as to an element
of an offense and requires the accused to come forward with evidence to rebut that presumption,
it is a violation of due process.” State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 348 (1990) overruled on other
grounds by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657 (2000); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).  The United States Supreme Court has
explained that, “a conclusive presumption . . .  would ‘conflict with the overriding presumption
of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the
crime,’ and would ‘invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns
solely to the jury.” Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (reversing defendant’s
conviction, finding that a reasonable juror could believe the instruction either created a
conclusive presumption regarding intent, or that it placed a burden on the accused to prove lack
of intent and a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory).
Conclusive presumptions in jury instructions violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id.  In State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749-750 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for a new trial, finding that the jury instructions constituted non-harmless
fundamental error where the instructions omitted one of the elements of the offense.  The Court
found that it could not “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the
same conclusion had it faced all of the statutory elements.” Id. at  749.   The Anderson Court
stated, “The United States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials “the State must prove
every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to
that requirement.” Id. (citation omitted).
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In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the United States Supreme Court stated,
“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard,
we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.” (Emphasis in original.) Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that
“[a] statutory presumption that is  mandatory,  i.e.,  that  is  conclusive proof of an element of the
crime or that requires the accused to present rebuttal evidence thereby shifting the burden of
proof, is unconstitutional.” State v. Hebner, 108 Idaho 196, 200 (Ct. App. 1985).
Here, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
Mr. Rubio guilty of filing a false instrument if they found only that the timecard was falsified.
The jury was not allowed to decide whether the document was an instrument that might be filed
under a law.  This deprived Mr. Rubio of his right to the due process of law.
When defense counsel objected to the State’s proposed instruction that the timecard was
an instrument, Judge Simpson again relied on Judge Mitchell’s holding at the motion to dismiss
hearing.  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.91, L.4 – p.92, L.2.)  He said, “It makes it the law of the case for
record, and all our hands are tied.”  (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.92, Ls.4-5.) Similarly, when defense
counsel objected to the State’s proposed jury instruction that read, “Under Idaho Law, proof of
completion of community service, when such service is done pursuant to a court order, may be
filed under the law of the State of Idaho,” the district court said, “But Judge Mitchell found it to
be so, did he not?” (7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.93, Ls.6-13.)9
9 As  support  for  both  of  these  proposed  jury  instructions,  the  State  cited  to  “Court’s  Oral
Decision on Motion to Dismiss; modeled after ICJI 422.”  (R., pp.93, 95.)  ICJI 422 reads as
follows:  “Under Idaho law, [name of substance(s)] [is a] [are] controlled substance[s].”  In the
comment, the Court noted that this issue is determined by whether the substance is listed in the
“[Uniform Controlled Substances] Act as a controlled substance” and would therefore be a
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As discussed above in Section II, Judge Simpson’s hands were actually not tied.
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983) (“it is not improper for a court to depart
from a prior holding if convinced that it is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice”).  And indeed, his decision to rely on Judge Mitchell’s order denying the motion to
dismiss resulted in manifest injustice in the form of due process violations.
Whether the timecard might be filed under any law was also an element of the crime.
Therefore, it was the jury’s province whether the timecard was filed under a law, or simply under
a court order.  The State had the burden to prove that there was a law under which the timecard
might be filed.  It did not do so.  And no statute or appellate court decision was cited in support
of its proposed instruction that the district court gave to the jury.  (R., pp.95, 146.)
Whether the timecard met the definition of an instrument was also a question for the jury.
The jury should have been given the definition of an instrument that defense counsel requested.
(7/18/16 Tr. Vol. II, p.93, L.25 – p.94, L.1.)  This was the law of Idaho.  Steel Farms, Inc., 154
Idaho at 265. Once provided with that definition, the jury should have decided whether the
timecard met that definition.  As such, these instructions removed the burden from the State of
proving that the timecard was an instrument that, if genuine, might be filed under any law. The
definition of an element is question of law, but whether the facts of the case fit within that
definition is a question for the jury. State v. Yermola, 367 P.3d 180, 183 (2016) (“When a jury
decides whether the elements of a crime or civil cause of action have been proved, it is not
question of law for the court to decide.  Thus, such an instruction is supported by Idaho Law.
I.C. § 37-2705.  Judge Mitchell’s holding was not “Idaho Law.”  Law is created by the
legislature. Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664 (1990).  Judge Mitchell’s order denying the
motion to dismiss was not a statute, and it was not an appellate court decision that could support
the State’s argument.
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determining what those elements should be. It is only deciding whether those elements have been
proved.”)
Inconsistently, Judge Simpson—despite Judge Mitchell’s holding that Mr. Rubio had
“filed” the timecard—did give the definition of the term “filing” to the jury.  (R., p.147.)  This
was the proper approach. Jury Instructions 16, 17, and 18, however, were conclusive
presumptions and took these decisions away from the jury.  (R., pp.144-46.)  Thus, the jury
instructions violated Mr. Rubio’s right to due process.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Rubio respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for the
offense, or remand for a new trial.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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